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ABSTRACT
Security has become, nowadays, a major concern for the or-
ganizations as the majority of its applications are exposed to
Internet, which increases the threats of security considera-
bly. Thus, the solution is to improve tools and mechanisms
to strengthen the protection of applications against attacks
and ensure the different security objectives. Among solu-
tions we will talking about, in this paper, there is Mutation
Analysis which is a technique of test that evaluates the qua-
lity of software tests and their ability to detect errors, It
also compares the criteria and test generation strategies. In
this study we will use the Mutation Analysis as a mean to
qualify the penetration tests, and then, apply this technique
in the security mechanisms and exactly on the mechanisms
of access control. At the end we will propose a method for
the elimination of hidden mechanisms for access control that
will allow the access control policy to evolve.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Web applications become a need for companies and organi-
zations as main communication tools and commercial win-
dows. Yet, this need is limited by security threats that in-
crease significantly every year. Among security threats ci-
ted, there are security flaws which the number of announced
ones continues to rise, according to statistics of the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures dictionary (CVE) that counts
more than 5000 new security flaws every year and until May
2012, there are more than 2000 new security attacks detec-
ted.
Thus, the solution to this problematic is to develop secu-
rity tools and mechanisms, and improve the existing ones to
strengthen the protection of applications against attacks, ta-
king into consideration the different security objectives (in-
tegrity, confidentiality, availability, authentication and non-
repudiation). Among security techniques there are Access
Control that ensures users access to resources respecting a
well defined security policy. This technique reinforces the
confidentiality, integrity as well as availability of informa-
tion, hence its importance in the security in general.
One of the mechanisms that we will propose for the security
problems mentioned in this study is the Mutation Analysis,
considered as a testing method that evaluates quality soft-
ware testing and its ability to detect errors, also compares
the criteria and test generation strategies. This technique is
detailed in the second part of the first section.
In this paper, we will talk in general, about the Mutation
Analysis applied in the computer security with two different
ways. The first one is the qualification of penetration test
detailed in the last part of the first section and the second
one is ensuring conformity between the code which implants
security and the Policy of Access Control.
We will use this study of Mutation Analysis application to
propose approaches and solutions to test access control me-
chanisms and interpret their robustness, as well as to detect
hidden ones. Then, we will give a concrete method for the
evolution of security policy without any problems that will
prevent modification of access control mechanisms. This me-
thod is detailed in the last part of the second section.
The first part of first section explains the basic principles
and provides a brief overview of some popular tools and ap-
proaches in relation with securing applications. In parallel,
the first part in the second section gives introduction and
definitions for Access Control and its mechanisms.
2. THEMUTATIONANALYSIS ANDPENE-
TRATION TESTS
2.1 The steps for securing the applications
There are several approaches that aim the application le-
vel security, among these approaches are those that seek to
directly secure the code,using static analysis and proof tech-
niques. These techniques vary from parsing to the formal
verification code and much more others. In our article, we
will present some examples of formal approaches like the
Proof-Carrying Code [2] and the ”Splint” tool [6].
A second type of approaches is to secure modeling in an
abstract way based on the requirements and security policy
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that we will establish using the Or-Bac model presented.
2.1.1 Proof and static analysis applied to security
As part of formal approaches we will mention two ones.
The first approach is the PCC (Proof-Carrying Code) intro-
duced by Necula and Lee as a new oncoming in which the
producer provides, at the same time, a compiled program
and validity proof (certificate)of this software.
Before the client implements the program, the proof will be
automatically verified by the user that possesses the tool
(an installed base called Trusted Computing Base or TCB)
which gives if the proof is valid for the provided program or
not.
The proof can concern any security policy defined by the
consumer, and any property of the program such as secu-
rity memory, as well as limiting access to the disk, or bank
transfers verification.
Figure 1: The working of PCC
It proves easy to check the certificate than creating it ; hence,
the use of PCC is promising because it can adapt to consu-
mer needs, requires less blind confidence and does not in-
volve time overhead at execution, as example, the case of
mobile phone.
The second approach is the Static Analysis used to identify
security flaws in the code. Most tools that use this approach
are generally based on an abstract compilation, data streams
and interpretation techniques to calculate an approximation
of program behavior.
One of these tools is Splint, it has the capacity to identify
places in the code which may represent security flaws. The
mentioned tool is based on annotations made in the source
code. These annotations are the assumptions of developer
concerning the progress of the execution (non-null parame-
ter, dynamic memory allocation ...). Therefore, Splint exa-
mines the code and ensures that these assumptions are veri-
fied by Static Analysis. It helps to list the places in the code
that are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks ; hence the
use of such approaches is recommended during the develop-
ment cycle but they are complex to implement and difficult
to reach, which justify that they are little used in practice.
For example, Splint produces many negatives faults. This is
unfortunately the case with most tools for detecting buffer
overflow as ARCHER, BOON, Splint, UNO, ...
The second disadvantage of these tools is that they fail to
distinguish between the vulnerable code and the corrected
code (detection alert even after the correction of the problem
location).
2.1.2 Modeling of requirements and security policies
The conception approach of security models is interesting
because it identifies new types of threats other than ones on
code level.
In principle, a security policy is based on a mix between se-
curity needs and logic job (This answer is generally given as
result of consultation between security experts and business
experts).
Indeed, there are a lot of security models, among them the
model (Organization Based Access Control)[8, 5] that was
developed as part of the RNRT MP6 (Models and Secu-
rity Policies of Information Systems and Communication in
Health and Social).
This model is one of the most interesting ones because it
addresses the modeling of security policies in an abstract
way at the organizational level independently of implanta-
tion, which means that the established OrBAC policy (cal-
led concrete) is derived from organizational policies. This
conceptual approach makes all retrieved policy in the Or-
BAC model, reproducible and scalable. Indeed, it doesn’t
require any readjustment at the concrete level that could
introduce an incoherence which is difficult to recover. Conse-
quently, everything is done at the organizational level.
First of all, it’s worth to mention what is an Access Control
model.
Access Control is the fact to grant privileges to subjects in
order to perform actions on objects.
– Subjects can be users, which means individuals and the
process they are using.
– Objects are also called resources, they can be system files,
relations in a database, printers, ...
– The possible actions in an information system are ”read”,
”write”, ”execute”, or in a database ”select”, ”update”...
The OrBAC objective is to enable modelling of variety of
security policies based on the context of the organization.
To achieve this purpose, and to reduce the complexity of
managing access rights, the OrBAC model relays on four
main principles :
– The organization is the main entity of the model. It is an
organized group of active entities ; which means, subjects
that plays some roles. Note that a group of subjects isn’t
necessarily considered as an organization. In other words,
each subject playing a role in the organization, corres-
ponds to a certain agreement between subjects to form
an organization. In particular, organization can be struc-
tured into several sub-organizations, each one with its own
security policy. As the structure of real organizations can
be made up of departments, services, ... A project or a
work group can be modelled by an organization.
– Two levels of abstraction (OrBAC Interactions) :
– a concrete level : subject, action, object
– an abstract level : role, activity, view
– The opportunity to express permissions, prohibitions, and
obligations.
– The opportunity to express contexts.
Thus, in addition to have a security policy independent of
its implementation, OrBAC has other advantages, it can ex-
press permissions, prohibitions and obligations, it also takes
in consideration the contexts, hierarchies and delegation.
The introduction of a level also allows the structuring of
entities as seen in the following diagram :
Figure 2: The OrBac model
Thus in OrBAC, a role is a set of subjects on which we ap-
plied the same security rules. Similarly, an activity is a set
of actions which are applied on the same security rules, and
the view is a set of objects which are applied on the same
security rules.
The context is defined for an organization, a subject, an
action and the given objects. Furthermore, Contexts can
express permissions or prohibitions under certain circum-
stances (emergency hospital, hours of work in a company,
...). It is easy to imagine that in an emergency context, we
desire that a nurse can access the lambda patient records
without having to call the administrator, that should gives
her the access rights (perhaps too late after). This possibi-
lity of varying authorizations is not offered by models like
DAC, MAC, RBAC, while in several organizations (hospital,
business, ...) there is a real need to grant privileges only in
specific circumstances.
To conclude, a security rule is defined in OrBAC as follows :
P (O, R, A, V, C) where :
– P : is a permission, prohibition, or obligation.
– O : is an organization.
– R : is a role.
– A : is an action.
– V : is a view.
– C : is a context.
Example : Permission (Computer Science Department, Ad-
ministrator, consultant, card customers, hours of work).
That is to say, give permission to the administrator of the
department to consult the card during office hours.
OrBAC model has been implemented in a prototype called
MotOrBac made by SERES the team of ENST. MotOrBac
allows to specify the modelling and define security policies
based on OrBac.
2.1.3 Security tests
Establishing mechanisms to protect an application depends
on two phases : code securing and modeling the security po-
licy of the application ; likewise, verifying the security of an
application is made with security tests. Thus, we will apply
different kinds of security tests on applications to determine
the effectiveness of security mechanisms.
Figure 3 shows that the stage of security testing is the final
step in securing application. If test results are negative then
the application is more or less secure. on the other side, if
results are positive we must retry the steps in order to cancel
security vulnerabilities that are detected during the phase of
security testing. then you must repeat the tests and the steps
until do not detect any security breach.
Figure 3: Security and applications development
cycle
Modelling of Attacks. We can model and describe attacks
using UML diagrams [10, 7], the use case diagrams show
the roles (the actors are both the attackers and the vic-
tims), while the state transition diagrams describe the steps
of realizing an attack, also sequence diagrams complement
the model by describing in details and step by step the pro-
gress of the attack. Figure 5 describes the website Cross Site
Scripting attack (XSS) using sequence diagram.
Modeling attacks in the form of diagrams aims to create a
Figure 4: XSS diagram sequence
support to penetration testing by teams of special testers
(also called Red Team). They model in high-level(rather
coarse), the actions to realize to execute these attacks. It
should be able to refine these diagrams to consider automa-
tion.
Attack simulator. The role of an attack simulators [3] is
to automate security tests. Among simulators that exist, we
can note the one which offers an original method to test
the robustness of security mechanisms, that protect against
buffer overflow attack. It is important to know that the si-
mulator does not reproduce the progress of the attack but
simulates its consequences on the execution stack ; and to
accomplish this task, it uses a dynamic compiler that allows
it to modify the execution stack. The simulation steps of
buffer overflow attack are the following :
– Launching the program to test in the dynamic compiler.
– The simulator determines if the block of elementary code
is vulnerable to attack : the process is to detect if the
code uses a predefined risky function, i.e that potentially,
code can cause a buffer overflow (copy functions of buffer,
unsecured array ...)
– The simulator modifies the execution stack to simulate
the attack : this step consists on modifying the data stack
to create an overflow, as a potential hacker will do.
– The processor executes the instructions : The impacts of
stack overflow that simulates the attack are propagated in
the system, as a real attack.
– Observing the reaction of the protection mechanism to de-
termine if the simulation of attack will fail.
Figure 5: The working of buffer overflow attack si-
mulator
This simulation attacks approach is interesting since it’s au-
tomated, rapid and systematic. It should be noted that it
is very recent and still limited to a particular type of buffer
overflow attack. Even if, the inventors propose to generalize
their approach for other types of buffer overflow attacks as
well as the whole of attacks, it still not usable ; for example,
we cannot simulate the code injection attacks because they
are beyond the scope of simulator use.
Penetration tests. The penetration test [1] is an offensive
method for evaluating information systems against most fa-
mous attacks. In order to apply this type of tests, we will be
in need of a team that will play the role of a pirate, and we
should follow the steps below :
– Analyze the system to evaluate, to well understand the
conception of his different components and have an idea
about the attacks that can be used and the scripts em-
ployed.
– Before applying scripts of attacks, it is necessary to adapt
these ones to the systems evaluated. These scripts are pro-
grams using the best and well known attacks in the world,
that was successful in the past on other system informa-
tion and which we strongly encouraged to test in this sys-
tem.
The application of penetration tests gives us two results,
which we will present in the following :
– If the script succeeds the attack against information sys-
tem (since most developers repeat the same security er-
rors), then the system is vulnerable.
– If the information system succeeds the penetration test,
we cannot judge whether the system is secure or not be-
cause :
– It remains vulnerable to new exploits (Zero Day Ex-
ploits).
– Or the attack script is unable to attack the information
system and in this case there is a problem of confidence
and quality of scripts attacks.
Problematic : The lack of confidence and quality given to
the attack scripts of penetration tests.
Solution proposed : Applying the technique of mutation
analysis used in the field of software test.
2.2 Presentation of Mutation analysis
The Mutation Test [4] is a technique that was proposed by
De-Millo and it consists on creating a set of faulty versions
of the test program called mutants. The goal for the tester
is then to write a series of tests that can distinguish the
original program from all its mutants. This technique aims
to write relevant tests and involves injecting faults. If the
tests applied to the program are able to detect these faults,
they can be considered as relevant to disclose faults.
The Mutation Analysis is based on the following steps :
– Create from a program P, a set of programs Pi called
mutants.
– Pi should be different from p by one and only one ele-
mentary modification introduced in syntactically correct
source code of P. This change is called mutation.
– Mutations are defined by operators that can be :
– Replacement of an operator by another operator.
– Changing a numerical value.
– Replacement of a symbol (symbol name of a constant,
a variable name, a table, ...).
This yields a set of mutants, each one containing a single
error. For example in the table below, we have replaced
the less-than symbol (<) by the greater-than one (>) to
have a mutant program.
Original program Mutant program
void min(int x,int y){ void min(int x,int y){
int minval=x ; int minval=x ;
if(y<x) minval=y ; if(y>x) minval=y ;
return minval ; return minval ;
} }
– Among the generated mutants, some are equivalent to
the original program. That is to say that no input data
can distinguish the two programs.
On the following table, the program minval is replaced by
mutant x in the first statement of the min function. Thus,
at this point, the program minval and x will always have
the same value, meaning that the mutant program is equi-
valent to the initial program and both programs give the
same results.
Original program Mutant program
int min(int x,int y){ int min(int x,int y){
int minval=x ; int minval=x ;
if(y<x) minval=y ; if(y<minval) minval=y ;
return minval ; return minval ;
} }
– The elimination of equivalent mutants is important before
proceeding with the analysis, as it is impossible for a test
to detect the equivalent mutant.
As a next step, we can run tests on the remaining mutants
(after eliminating equivalent mutants). If the test performed
on a mutant produces an output different from that of the
original program, then the test detected the mutant and it
is said that the test has killed the mutant. Otherwise the
mutant is alive.
When a mutant was killed, it can be removed from the tes-
ting process because the faults that it contained were detec-
ted and this allowed to locate the pertinent test. However, if
we keep the mutant in the process, we will run each test on
all mutants and we will be able to associate with each test
a score of a mutation that corresponds to the proportion
of mutants that the process has killed. This score is used as
a quality index of a test. If a test T killed m mutants and
there are a total of M mutants, the mutation score test T
is :
SM (T) = m / M
The overall process of generation test by mutation is the-
refore consisting on generating all mutants of the program,
then creating and executing tests on mutants. While some
mutants are still alive, we check if they are not equivalent
to the initial program, if they are not, we add tests to try
killing them ; and we loop until getting a mutation score
that satisfy us. This process of mutation analysis is descri-
bed in Figure 6 : There are several tools of transformation,
Figure 6: The working of mutation analysis
but Mujava is the most available and most widely used tool,
although it is not really effective.
2.3 Mutation Analysis and Securing applica-
tions
Giving an approach two fields, software tests (Mutation Ana-
lysis) and computer security (Penetration Tests) will lead us
to a correspondence between their elements. Thus, during
this study we will focus on two important points :
– The first one is the Mutation Operators dedicated to se-
curity, therefore, the creation of the security mutants.
– The second one is the use of these mutants to qualify the
Penetration Tests.
2.3.1 The Mutation Operators dedicated to security
A fault inside a security framework is seen as a security flaw.
Therefore, the injection of a fault in the security is only an
injection, but at this time, it is a security flaw. This latter is
generally based on the perturbation of the application envi-
ronment using the interaction points of the application such
as variables, files and processes.
Consequently, a Mutation Operator is a modification or a
deletion of an interaction point, on condition that this will
create a perturbation in the application environment, and
more specifically in the security, which implies the creation
a security flaw.
The following figure summarizes the procedure of the iden-
tification and the creation of the mutation operators.
Figure 7: Flaws injection technique
The main disadvantage of this technique consists on its diffi-
culty to be automated. Once the point of interaction is per-
turbed, the conception of the attack scenario can be done
only manually. Among the Mutation Operators that are nee-
ded to create mutants for the security tests :
– The operators that will remove the verification code from
user data that are put in dynamic requests, such as au-
thentication code and distribution of access rights.
– The operators that will eliminate the effect of input control
code at the level of communication interfaces between the
user and the application.
2.3.2 The qualification of Penetration Tests
The mutants are the variants of the original application
which has released some of its protective mechanisms. A se-
curity mutant differs from the reference application by the
introduction of errors in one or many of its security me-
chanisms. Thus, we can couple an error in the input user
treatment with an error in the implementation of the secu-
rity policy. We are therefore looking for creating mutants by
mutating the control code of input. Moreover, we can couple
a flaw in the security interfaces with vulnerability introdu-
ced voluntarily in the security policy (for example, in access
to the database, we can give a write access to an application
that has only read access).
To illustrate this approach, the figure 8 shows a simplified
points in which we can voluntarily introduce a flaw in an
information system connected to the Internet, such as : the
communication interfaces with users, management of buf-
fers, stacks of execution and implementation of the security
policy (for example, defined with the model Or-Bac). We
take as a prototype of test, a client-server application 3-tier
type (so with database). This database will implement se-
curity policies (created from MotOrBAC for example).
Figure 8: Mutant model of testing attacks in 3-tier
application
There are similarities between the software test and the pe-
netration test. Both approaches aim to find bugs and errors
in applications. However, there are some points of diver-
gence. Bugs are easier to find, in view of that the application
produces erroneous execution traces. Yet, security flaws are
generally more subtle to detect. Indeed, the application ha-
ving security flaws can behave in a normal way concerning
features it ensures, this is the case of flaws related to the in-
jection of code : The interpreted application code is correct,
but it is vulnerable to attacks. So the attack scripts that will
test cases must not only pass the level presentation, but also
access the database (even modify it).
For the evaluation of the test results of attack, the execution
traces cannot be used (except for the stack overflow attacks
when we get a segmentation error). This implies that the
success of the attack depends on the access of test script to
the database, in which it attempts to execute an operation,
meaning that the success of the test depends on the success
of this operation.
We can summarize our approach in the following way :
The elements :
– An application that will be used to evaluate the security
tests.
– The script of penetration test that is the test subject.
The steps :
1. The creation of mutants :
(a) The identification of the interaction points in the
application that will create security flaws. There-
fore, the identification of mutation operators.
(b) The creation of security mutants by using at least
one mutation operator.
2. The evaluation of the penetration test :
(a) Applying the attack script of this penetration test
to the mutants created.
(b) Observing the effect of the evaluation :
– If the attack script succeeds to do access of at
least one mutant to the database. So, the pene-
tration test corresponding to this script is consi-
dered a well qualified test .
– Else, the penetration test is disqualified.
3. MUTATION ANALYSIS AND ACCESS
CONTROL
3.1 Presentation of Access Control
3.1.1 The access control
Access Control is the data protection against threats of confi-
dentiality (disclosure unauthorized), integrity (Unauthori-
zed modification)and availability (denial of service) when
sharing data between multiple users. To ensure this protec-
tion, each data access must be controlled and obviously all
unauthorized access must be strictly blocked.
The development of an Access Control model is based on
the definition of access control policies that determine ac-
cess permissions to data. This model ensures that data are
accessible only for users having the access rights. In gross,
Access Control ensures that user access to resources must
respect a well-defined security policy.
The establishment of a general view, which is not limited
to one existed access control model (DAC, MAC, RBAC,
Gold-Bac, ...) will lead us to use a model for hierarchical ar-
chitecture with two types of security requirements (permis-
sions and prohibitions), and which incorporates the principle
of constraints (temporary, Space, ...) that has as name ”the
context”.
A rule of our model is described as follows P(R, A, C)
where : P : permission or prohibition ; R : role ; A : action ;
C : context.
Take the example of a faculty management system that of-
fers management features of students, teachers and staff.
In this application, the user can perform two operations :
view their account and access to the courses. The resources
that will be controlled are the accounts, marks and folders
of users and staff. Entities A and R can be ordered hie-
rarchically. For example in the management application of
a faculty, there are two types of roles : user and personal.
Concerning student and teacher roles, they inherit the user
role. This hierarchy allows to define rules at the user’s role
level, to be then applied to the student and teacher roles.
Finally, there are five temporal contexts : the work duration,
the period of deliberation, studies, holiday and default, all
this entities are detailed in Figure 9. Once the entities defi-
ned, the access control policy must be written. Examples of
rules :
R1 : Permission(Administrator, create account, work dura-
tion)
R2 : Permission(user, user activities, work duration)
R3 : Prohibition (Teacher, enter marks, studies)
There are two types of rules : primary and concrete. The pri-
mary rules are the set of defined ones. By cons, concrete rules
are all those obtained after deriving primary rules basing on
the hierarchy (which is obtained by the relation : specifi-
cation / generalization), it is the case of R2 rule, which is
applied to ”user activity” and designates all the actions that
user can make (which are from Figure 9 : Consult his ac-
count, Benefit from services, Access to courses). We must
Figure 9: The Entities of a management system of a
faculty
distinguish between primary and concrete rules. If an actor
plays mostly the role of rule R2, he simultaneously plays
the role of the rule R1. Therefore, we say that the rule R1
is primary and R2 is concrete. For Example in the hierarchy
shown in the diagram above, the teacher is also a user. So,
whenever a person is associated with the role of teacher, he
also plays the role of the user.
3.1.2 Integration of an access control policy Archi-
tecture in application
An application implementing an access control policy must
have an architecture with two separate parts, the first named
Business Logic (BL) contains the code that implants func-
tional requirements of system, and the second called Access
Control (AC). For instance, the management system of a
faculty contains code to enter marks, modify accounts and
update the database.
The access control policy is encapsulated in a component cal-
led PDP (Policy Decision Point), which can store the access
control policy either in a text file or a database, to imple-
ment security rules and then set or change the policy. The
PDP is used by PEPs (Policy Enforcement Point) placed in
points of application where they will execute the security
rules, just before the execution of features that are moni-
tored by the access control policy. PEPs have a dual role,
first of all, they send requests to the PDP with information
about the user’s role, his activity, the view demanded and
the contexts. The PDP then decides if the requested access
is permitted or prohibited, basing on the rules of the access
control policy and sends this decision to the PEP concerned
that will apply it.
The PDP is based on rules of an access control policy and as
this latter is generated automatically, it is also automatically
generated. By cons, the PEP operates in a manual way to
adjust successfully to the code and application architecture.
3.2 The tests andmutation operators designed
for access control
3.2.1 Mutation operators designed for Access Control
The fact that the business logic party is separated from the
access control policy, will simplify for us the injection of
faults in the access control mechanisms. So, we proceed to
the replacement of used policy by the PDP, to get an imple-
mentation of the mutant policy.
The creation of mutants is performed systematically via mu-
tation operators, where each one injects a particular type of
error and only one error is injected at the same time to create
each mutant. With [9], we proposed the following mutation
operators :
Basic operators changing the type
PPR (permission to prohibition) replaces a rule of per-
mission by a prohibition.
PRP (prohibition to permission) replaces a rule prohi-
biting by permission.
Basic operators changing parameters
RRD (role replaced with different one) replaces the role
of a rule by another role selected randomly.
CRD (context replaced with different one) replaces the
context of rule by another context selected ran-
domly.
Basic operators modifying the hierarchy
RPD (parent role replaced with a descendant) replaces
a role of a rule by one of its descendants (thus
changing the derived rules)
APD (Parent Action replaced with a descendant) re-
places an action in rule by one of its descendants
(thus changing the derived rules)
Advanced Operator
ANR adds a new rule not belonging to defined rules
part.
It is important to emphasize that these operations do not
produce equivalent mutants. Indeed, the mutants created by
construction, contain different rules from the initial policy
because they add a new rule or modify an existing one.
There are two types of mutation operators, the basic opera-
tors (all operators except ANR) and the advanced mutation
operators called ANR, that are special because they aim
to test the default behavior of access control mechanism.
Truly, any policy of access control contains X rules and a
default one (permission or prohibition) that is applied when
the other rules do not correspond to entities of a query. The
ANR operator can create rules that replace the default rule
and complement the X defined rules. That’s why it’s an ad-
vanced operator as it allows to test the robustness of the
access control mechanism.
3.2.2 The creation of access control tests
There are two types of tests [9] : functional and security ones.
The first type aims to test the functionality of an information
system, while the second type is designed to test the security
of an information system. Concerning security tests genera-
ted from the access control policy, they aim to validate the
compliance of the security mechanism with its access control
policy. Both types are interconnected as the functional tests
also validate compliance with the access control policy.
Figure 10 shows the three parts of a test, whether functional
or security :
Figure 10: The three parts of a test
To illustrate the difference between functional and security
tests, we present two simple examples :
1. Functional test : Tests student accesses to a course :
– Intention : Test whether downloading a course is
available for the student.
– Sequence : Enter the account and download a course
while in school.
– Oracle : The number increases during download.
2. Security test : Tests the ability of a student to access
a course during studies (as specified by CA policy) :
– Intention : Tests whether a student has the right
to download a course in the worked days .
– Sequence : Enters the account and download a
course during studies.
– Oracle : Questioning the PDP to ensure that the
right rules are enabled.
The Generation of security tests is based on several criteria
representing the test objectives to evaluate the information
system and decide whether a problem exists or not.
We propose the following three criteria :
1. All primary rules : Cover the primary rules, if the
rule is differentiable, then test one of its derived rules.
2. All the concrete rules : Cover the entire concrete
rules.
3. All default rules : This criterion is intended to vali-
date all the default rules not specified in the security
policy.
Figure 11: The different types of tests and their cri-
terias
The definition of a primary rule accords to its differentia-
bility or not, we can say that it’s also concrete if it derives
from itself. By cons, a concrete rule is a rule that inherits
from an another one.
With this logic, and using only the second criterion (all
concrete rules), tests can cover all the rules of the access
control policy, whether primary or concrete. That leaves, to
cover the default rules and that is the objective of tests ge-
nerated from the third criterion (all default rules).
To conclude, we must say that the right strategy is to use
very specific security tests and to combine the two criteria
covering both : all concrete and all default rules.
3.3 Mutation Analysis and hiddenmechanisms
for access control
The best approach to implement an access control policy is
to separate PDP from the business logic part. However, se-
paration is rarely perfectly clear, especially in older systems.
When it comes to change the access control policy of these
applications, it is necessary to locate these places in the code
that prevents the system evolution, because they implement
directly the access control rules in the code.
In this section, we will outline the use of mutation as an ef-
fective way to detect hidden mechanisms. We will first des-
cribe the problem encountered which we are trying to solve
and then present the approach based on the mutation. We
will also present a general mutation approach to guide the
evolution of system access control policy .
3.3.1 The hidden mechanisms of access control
The access control mechanisms can be of different natures.
Thus, there are explicit visible mechanisms, and implicit hid-
den ones :
– The explicit mechanisms are implanted in the code :
– The explicit mechanisms are visible when you have a
traceability link or documentation to establish a rela-
tionship with the access control policy (or part thereof).
For example, in Figure 12 the visible explicit mecha-
nism uses an external component (which is the ”secu-
rity Policy Service”) responsible for applying security
policy, this controllable component is based on an ac-
cess control policy .
– An explicit mechanism is said hidden when we don’t
have any information to link this mechanism with a rule
in the access control policy. For instance, in Figure 12
the hidden explicit mechanism directly applies an access
control rule (denying access based on a condition).
Figure 12: Example of explicit access control mecha-
nisms
– The implicit mechanisms represent access control constraints
integrated into the architecture itself of the code or sys-
tem. The figure 13 illustrates an example of an implicit
mechanism, where by construction, the class ”Secretary”
does not have a method to modify an account. Note that
the implicit implantation of an access control rule pro-
hibits access to the secretaries to modify accounts. The
access control policy is expressed implicitly via the ”class”
model, which makes its development more difficult. In this
example, the fact of allowing secretaries to change the ac-
counts is due to adding in the class ”Server”a new method
”Modify Account (secretary, account)”. In this case modi-
fication is easy, but in other cases, the modification can be
difficult and tedious even not impossible (especially when
there is a significant coupling between classes).
Figure 13: Example of implicit access control mecha-
nisms
Modifying an access control rule implicitly implemented
by one of these mechanisms, involves doing the ”refacto-
ring” (rework)of architecture.
The access control mechanisms whether explicit or implicit,
must be taken into account during the evolution of the CA
policy by following the steps noted below :
1. Explicit and visible mechanisms must be modified and
tested.
2. Hidden and explicit mechanisms may be in conflict
with the new policy. So, They must be located and
removed.
3. Implicit mechanisms may prevent the development of
policy. In this case the model must be modified or re-
designed to make the application more flexible.
To Summarize, we can say that there are two hidden mecha-
nisms for access control : explicit hidden mechanisms and
implicit ones. These two mechanisms prevent the evolution
of the access control policy. Therefore, detect and eliminate
these hidden mechanisms will be the purpose of our method
based on Mutation Analysis.
3.3.2 Detection of hidden mechanisms for access control
via Mutation Analysis
We will present an approach that follows the detection me-
thod of hidden access control mechanisms. We should res-
pect the order of these steps without forgetting any step :
1. Applying the mutation on the access control policy
using the initial two change operators of types PRP
and PPR, which simulates an incremental evolution of
the policy.
2. Implementing and creating tests from the mutant po-
licy. In other words, the tests created will cover the
rules of the access control mutants.
3. Disabling all visible security mechanisms on the initial
information system (ie : we want to evaluate its access
control policy ), which is easy because the activated
rules are known.
4. After disabling security mechanisms, the information
system doesn’t contain any prohibition. So, when laun-
ching tests on this system, if these tests are successful,
there will be no hidden security mechanism, otherwise,
the failed tests necessarily indicate the existence of hid-
den security mechanisms.
This approach gives us a solution based on tests to detect
the hidden access control mechanisms and also the rules sub-
sequently implanted by them. This method allows to find an
indicator that estimates the flexibility of an information sys-
tem. This flexibility is the number of visible rules divided by
the total number of security rules (which is visible or hid-
den).
3.3.3 Evolution of Security Policy
A micro-evolution as the name suggests, is a small change
in the access control policy. There are two types of micro-
evolution :
– δ+ : which relaxes the policy by adding a permission or
removing a prohibition.
– δ− : which restricts the policy by adding a prohibition or
removing a permission.
A security policy is a set of permission and prohibition. The-
refore, it is indeed a set of micro-evolution. As shown in the
Figure 14 diagram, the evolution of an initial security po-
licy to another final one is simply an application of a set
of micro-evolution on the first one to reach a new security
policy.
Figure 14: The micro-evolutions
The following formula shows the evolution of an initial access
control policy SPInit to a new access control policy SPNew :
∆(SPInit) = δ+−n ◦ δ+−n−1 ◦ δ+−n−2 ◦ ..... ◦ δ+−1 (SPInit)
= SPNew
As was previously mentioned, the evolution of the system
is a set of micro-evolution. If we can detect the hidden
mechanisms that prevent the establishment of each micro-
evolution, then we can modify the code to eliminate these
hidden mechanisms, meanings that the access control policy
can evolve using the set of micro-evolution evaluated.
The approach adopted to modify the access control policy
of an information system is :
1. Formulate new rules of access control policy in the form
of a set of micro-evolution.
2. Create a single mutant from each micro-evolution.
3. Generate test cases for each mutant policy (ie : each
mutant).
4. Disable visible access control mechanisms in the mu-
tant that corresponds to the micro-evolution.
5. Start the test generating mutant policy.
6. There are two possible cases :
– If the test passes. So, no hidden mechanism against
micro-evolution.
– Otherwise, the existence of hidden mechanisms.
7. In the second case, we must eliminate the hidden me-
chanisms since they are detected. Then repeat the me-
thod from beginning to end.
8. Implant and document the micro-evolution in the vi-
sible mechanism.
In this part of our study we have tried to give a detailed
overview of the access control policies. Then, we have intro-
duced the technique of Mutation Analysis specified in access
control and used as a support to evaluate the criteria for ge-
nerating tests.
On the other hand, to change the access control policy of
an application, we have proposed a comprehensive approach
based on tests and mutation to solve the problem of hidden
access control mechanisms.
4. CONCLUSION
This article presents a summary of a study conducted in the
field of computer security, specifically, web application se-
curity. This study will lead us to make a link between two
aspects relating two research disciplines that are : Testing
out different software and Security.
During the process of collecting and research, we started
working on security as a means for securing applications,
which allowed us at the first time to see the different crite-
ria and security aspects such as the three levels (application,
system and network) and the five main objectives (integrity,
confidentiality, availability, no-repudiation and authentica-
tion).
Thus, after a research conducted on the majority of existing
attacks types so far, we are confident that the applications
need a security that affects several points, starting with the
code, through the modeling of security policies, and arriving
to security tests that evaluate the security mechanisms im-
plemented in applications.
In this regard, we thought to apply Mutation Analysis as a
method of software test field on scripts of security tests, and
that to qualify and ensure their ability to be a true evalua-
tion tool that detects remained flaws in an application after
the securing phase.
In the second time, we decided to apply the technique of
Mutation Analysis on other security disciplines such as ac-
cess control.
Access control tests are similar to other security tests, unless
they have a specification to be based on rules established in
the access control policy.
Thanks to this specification we succeed to precise the exact
types of criteria that can generate good quality of access
control tests. Then, we have solved the problem of hidden
access control mechanisms preventing the development of se-
curity policy, by proposing an approach applied during the
phase of the evolution of access control policy.
In this study, it remains to implement these techniques and
to apply them on real cases to reach the experimental results
with statistics, to be able to generalize our solution.
As perspective, we will try to take the security from different
points of view, to migrate the techniques and solutions that
are successful in other fields, also to adapt them to the com-
puter security field.
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